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specified by the executor, to vote for the testator's widow as a director
of a corporation. Before the executor had specified the form of the
agreement, one legatee died. Although the legatee had not yet agreed
in writing, he had given the executor his oral assent to be bound. The
court ruled that the legacy should be paid to the estate of the legatee
because the condition had been substantially performed and this per-
formance would effectuate the will of the testator. It should be noted
that in this case there was never any laxity on the legatee's part. The
same result could have been reached by treating the condition as one
which was at all times impossible of complete performance.
Conclusion
The divergence in treatment of realty and personalty is a relic
of the practice, hundreds of years ago, of administering legacies and
devises in different courts. 61 The in terrorem anomaly developed as
a result of that same dichotomy of jurisdiction. Certainly there is
neither purpose nor justification for their existence today. Although
there has been some tendency in recent years toward eliminating
them,6 2 progress must necessarily be slow in eradicating usages so
long established in the law.
SITUS OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
It is an apparent anomaly to discuss the situs of intangible
property. Can there be any "'proprietary right, which is not the
object of corporeal substance' "? ' Intangibles, having no physical
existence, occupy no space and therefore can have no actml location.
In conflict of laws problems, however, situs of property often must be
61 See Browder, Conditions And Limitations In Restraint Of Marriage,
39 MicH. L. REv. 1288, 1290-91 (1941).62 Matter of Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 468-69, 18 N.E.2d 658, 662 (1939)
(dictum) ; see, e.g., In re Blind's Will, 138 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Surr. Ct. 1954). In
the Blind case, a daughter was to inherit the remainder of property only if she
became a widow or divorced from her then husband, otherwise she was to get
only the income from the property. The court held the condition void as
against public policy as tending to induce divorce. The court further ruled that
the daughter was to get the property, both real and personal, in fee simple
absolute. This, of course, is a departure from the rule that where an illegal
condition is attached to realty, both conditions and devise are void. See note 25
su~pra.
1 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2362, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 233 (K.B. 1769)
see 13 ILL. L. REv. 708, 711-12 (1919).
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determined in order to confer jurisdiction over a cause of action 2 upon
a court, or to control the choice of law which will resolve an action.3
Since situs can be essential, intangibles have been artificially located.
The application of these fictions has resulted in divergent, and often
conflicting, theories of determining situs. A survey of the rules gov-
erning the situs of various intangibles will illustrate their ethereal
nature.
INTANGIBLES BY OPERATION OF LAw
Obligations and interests arising out of legal relations among
persons are denominated intangible property created by operation of
law.4  A debt, for example, is such property. Although some may
deny that they are capable of having a situs,5 courts have nevertheless
assigned a situs to debts. For taxation purposes, the situs of the debt
may be the domicile of the creditor. 6 In the administration of an
estate, the situs is the domicile of the debtor.7 Since an insurer's
promise is in the nature of a debt,8 the situs of this obligation is gen-
erally considered to be at the residence of the debtor.9 A garnishment
presents a further complication 10 in that it involves two obligations
and three parties. This situation arises when D, an absent non-
resident, is indebted to C. D has a claim against G. Can C satisfy
his claim against D by proceeding against G in D's continued absence?
This question presents a problem as to the situs of the original debt.
It was not clarified when the Supreme Court rejected a contention
that the debt continued to be located with the debtor ". and held that
the situs of the debt 2 was wherever the garnishee could be found.' 3
A bond certificate is of great advantage in determining the situs of
2 See Beale, The Situs Of Things, 28 YALE L.J. 525 (1919); 32 COLUM.
L. REv. 1441 (1932).
3 See Briggs, The Jurisdictional-Choice-Of-Law Relation In Conflicts
Rules, 61 HARV. L. Rav. 1165, 1177, 1201 (1948).
4 See REsTATEmENT, CONFLICt OF LAWS § 213 (1934).
5 See Note, 39 HARV. L. REv. 485, 486 (1926).
6 1 BEai.a, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS 301-02 (1935).
7 Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U.S. 654, 656 (1884) (dictum).
s See Liberty v. Kinney, 242 Iowa 656, 47 N.W.2d 835 (1951).
9 See, e.g., Furst v. Brady, 375 Ill. 425, 31 N.E.2d 606 (1940) ; Gordon v.
Shea, 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E.2d 105 (1938) ; Robinson v. Dana's Estate, 87 N.H.
114, 174 At. 772 (1934).
10 See Beale, The Exercise Of Jurisdictio rn Rein To Compel Paynnent Of
A Debt, 27 HARv. L. REv. 107, 118 (1913).
"2 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
12 See RESTATEE T, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 108 (1934). The explicit problem
of situs is avoided, but the view of the instant case is adopted-jurisdiction over
the garnishee controls.
'3 It should be noted that this ruling places a harsh burden upon the prin-
cipal debtor. Notice of the pending action is required to be given by the gar-
nishee to the debtor. See Harris v. Balk, supra note 11 at 227. However, the
debtor still must travel to the forum to defend or be bound by the possibly
indifferent defense of the garnishee.
1956]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
this type of debt. It may be considered "a matrix-like container for
the property." 14 Thus, its situs is identified with the location of the
bond.15 While it has been said that the domicile of the obligor 16 or
the domicile of the holder 17 may control its situs, the physical presence
of the bond would appear to furnish the most orderly medium of
establishing jurisdiction.'8 Other commercial paper may be regarded
as property separate and apart from the obligations they represent.19
Thus, so far as negotiable instruments are concerned, the location of
the paper itself is the situs of the property.20 The Restatement,
though avoiding mention of "situs," supports this view.
2
'
Stock, representing a right to property, constitutes intangible per-
sonal property.22 Its situs has been variously held to be at the domi-
cile of the owner 2 and at the place where the certificate is found.
2 4
However, the more authoritative rule would seem to be that the domi-
cile of the corporation is the basis of situs.2 5
The situs of intangibles by operation of law also assumes im-
portance when it is necessary to determine the jurisdiction of a state
for the purpose of administering a decedent's property 26 Once juris-
diction is established, the applicable law of succession must be chosen.
14 First Trust Co. v. Matheson, 187 Minn. 468, 246 N.W. 1, 3 (1932).
15 Gilmore v. Robillard, 44 F2d 295 (9th Cir. 1930). But see Cities Service
Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952), where it was held that the obligations
represented by bearer bonds issued by a United States corporation, but located
abroad, were subject to American seizure. Such an action, however, was au-
thorized under the "war powers" and does not necessarily contradict the tradi-
tional conflicts rule. See Dean, Conflict Of Laws, 1952 ANN. SuRvEY Am. L.
38, 57, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36, 55 (1953).
16The Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 209 (1930)
(dictum).
17 See Andrews, Situs Of Intangibles In Suits Against Nonresident
Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241, 242 (1939).
18 Id. at 244.
19 Id. at 246.
20 See Manning v. Berdan, 132 Fed. 382, 386 (C.C.D. N.J. 1904); FALCON-
BRIDGE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 489-90 (2d ed. 1954).
2 1 "A negotiable instrument is a document embodying a right; and the state
which has jurisdiction of the document has jurisdiction of the right."
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §52, comment a (1934).
22 See Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1 (1900).
2 See Kilgour v. New Orleans Gas Light Co., 14 Fed. Cas. 468, No. 7764
(C.C.D. La. 1875); Beverly Beach Properties, Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So. 2d 604(Fla. 1953) (dictum), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
24 See Bowles v. R.G. Dun-Bradstreet Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 32, 12 A.2d 392
(Ch. 1940). It is interesting to note that the national adoption of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act may well herald the victory of the view that situs is where
the certificate is. See Baker, In The Administration Of Intangibles: Missouri's
Section 466.010 In Perspective, 19 Mo. L. REv. 1, 27-29 (1954).
25 See, e.g., Doherty v. McDowell, 276 Fed. 728 (D. Me. 1921); Lockwood
v. United States Steel Corp., 209 N.Y. 375, 103 N.E. 697 (1913); Iron City
Say. Bank v. Isaacsen, 158 Va. 609, 164 S.E. 520 (1932).
26 See Dean, Conflict Of Laws, 1948 ANN. SuavwY AM. L. 41, 55; Simmons,
Conflict of Laws and Constitutional Law in Respect to Intangibles, 26 CALIF. L.
REv. 91, 94 (1937).
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It is the general rule that the law of the decedent's domicile controls
the distribution of property.2 However, in a recent New York case
there was a departure from this rule.28 An intestate who had deposits
in New York banks died without heirs or next of kin, while domiciled
in California. The Appellate Division reversed the Surrogate's de-
cision 29 that the property be transmitted to California to be admin-
istered according to that state's laws. In holding that the property
should escheat to New York, it was said that the state "recognizes
no situs but its own, and lays claim to such property." 30
Confusion in determining the situs of intangibles by operation of
law is superficially solved by the Restatement.3 ' The controlling law
is there said to be "the law of the state which created the original
intangible thing and interest therein." 32 While this criterion solves
the situs problem, it presents the equally vexing questions of when
and where the "creation" takes place.
REAL INTANGIBLES
Intangible property which has an existence in fact, such as the
good-will of a business or a trade name,33 may be termed "real in-
tangibles." 3 4 The increasing importance and influence of industrial-
ization has made the legal protection of real intangibles necessary.
The spread of commerce necessitates uniform treatment. Just as there
is no uniformity in the treatment of situs in intangibles by operation
of law, the situs of real intangibles is equally unsettled. An examina-
tion of the law will demonstrate, however, that the prime issue is not
which of several rules should be applied to determine situs but, rather,
whether situs need be determined at all.
Copyright
There is considerable doubt as to whether or not copyrights are
property. Many of the elements of property, such as the right to
perpetual ownership or acquisition by prescription or adverse posses-
27 See GOoDmicH, CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 165 (3d ed. 1949).28 See Matter of Menschefrend, 283 App. Div. 463, 128 N.Y.S2d 738 (1st
Dep't 1954).2 9 Matter of Brown, 204 Misc. 661, 124 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
30 Matter of Menschefrend, supra note 28 at 468, 128 N.Y.S.2d at 746. In
Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), the dissent stated that
intangibles (corporate stock) could be claimed by several states for escheat:
state of incorporation, owner's domicile, or the state of obligor's main place of
business. See Dean, Conflict Of Laws, 1951 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 43, 69.31 RESTATEmET, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 213 (1934).
32 Ibid.
33 See RFSTATEmENT, CONrLICT OF LAWS § 212, comment a (1934).
34 See 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 51.1 (1935).
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sion, are not applicable to copyrights.3 5 However, in the United
States,3 6 England 3 7 and France, 8 copyrights are considered to beproperty. Whether property or not, they exist only by virtue of
statute.3 9 While it is unsettled whether there was an English common-
law copyright prior to the Statute of Anne,40 it is certain that the
enactment of that law made copyrights exclusively statutory.41 Theframers of the Constitution, conscious of the dangers of conflicting
state laws,42 authorized federal control 43 and that exclusive control has
been exercised.4 4  Thus the conflicts problem in this field is solelyinternational; as a general rule, copyrights are governed by the law of
the place where protection is sought.
The case of Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc. 45 illus-
trates the intangible nature of copyrights and their dependence upon
statute for existence. The United States copyright statute in effect at
the time,46 provided that a citizen of a foreign state was protected ifdomiciled in the United States or if the foreign state afforded reci-
procity to American copyrights. An alien, Adolf Hitler, wrote and
registered Mein Kampf while a stateless person. The court held that
copyright protection is extended to all authors except citizens of un-
reciprocating states; thus, a stateless alien is protected. It is well
settled that stateless persons have no protectible rights in internationallaw. 47 Since a stateless person has no domicile whose laws can create
a right, such an alien can have no protection. It is apparent that if
35 See I LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
PROPERTY § 4 (1938).
36 Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Price, 170 F.2d 715, 718 (5th Cir. 1948)(dictum); People v. McGraw Elec. Co., 375 Ill. 241, 30 N.E.2d 903, 905 (1940)(dictum); cf. In re Armour's Estate, 11 N.J. 257, 94 A.2d 286, 294 (1952)(dictum).
37 See Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Brown 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774);Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
38 See I LADAS, op. cit. supra note 35.
39 Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909) (dictum);Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 252 (1888) (dictum) ; Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 223, 232 (1834) (dictum).
408 ANNE c. 19 (1709). This first copyright statute was later repealed.4 HALSBURY, STATUTES OF ENGLAND 769 (2d ed. 1948).
41 American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907)(dictum) ; see Donaldson v. Beckett, supra note 37.
42 "The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either [patents
or copyrights] .... ".THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 267 (Lodge ed. 1888)(Madison).
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
44 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1952); Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co.,58 F. Supp. 523, 544 (D. Neb. 1944) (dictum), aff'd, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir.1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 809 (1947).
45 104 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 597 (1939), 13 So. CALIF.
L. REV. 356 (1940).
4635 STAT. 1077 (1909).
47 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 312 (7th ed., Lauterpacht 1948).Stateless aliens, however, could be beneficiaries of express treaties or inter-
national protection. Id. § 291.
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protection is given, the situs of the copyright exists independently of
the domicile or the location of the owner and the place of creation.
Situs, therefore, is established at the place where the protection is
sought.
Historically, there has been a great divergence between the rights
of alien and native authors. The thirteen original states protected only
citizens or residents,48 and the first federal statute retained this prefer-
ential treatment.49  This policy encouraged piracy of alien works; it
was not until the end of the nineteenth century that this inequity was
remedied by protecting citizens of a reciprocating foreign country.50
The recent adoption of the Universal Copyright Convention provides
a more complete solution. The "national treatment principle" which
is thereby adopted 51 is a combination of the Berne Treaty theory that
a work is governed by the publishing country, and the American con-
cept that the nationality of the author controls.52  The single standard
of protection now available provides ". . . minimum requirements
which will afford equal treatment to an author of one member state
seeking protection in the other member states." 13 Foreign and
domestic authors are granted identical treatment within the boundaries
of a signatory state.5 4 Since the Convention was not self-executing,r5
Congress, after ratification of the treaty by the Senate,5 6 found it
necessary to revise the copyright statutes. Upon enactment of such
legislation 5 7 no conflict between American law and the provisions of
the Universal Copyright Convention remained.58  Although only
eighteen countries now adhere to the convention, 9 the right of other
nations to accede 60 demonstrates the possibility that the conflict of
laws problem as to copyrights may be rendered entirely moot.
48 See Sherman, The Universal Copyright Convention: Its Effect On United
States Law, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 1137, 1139 (1955).
49 1 STAT. 124 (1790).
5026 STAT. 1110 (1891).
51 "Published works of nationals of any Contracting State and works first
published in that State shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the same
protection as that other State accords to works of its nationals first published
in its own territory." Universal Copyright Convention art. II, § 1.
52 Kaminstein, c): Key to Universal Copyright Protection (Article III:
Formalities), in UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANALYZED 23, 24 (1955).
53 Tannenbaum, The Principle of 'National Treatment' and Works Protected:
Articles I and II, in UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANALYZED 13, 16
(1955).
54 See c John Doe 1955, 2 U.N. Rm 25, 27 (1956).
55 Universal Copyright Convention art. X, § 1.
50 See 100 CONG. REc. 8495 (daily ed. June 25, 1954).
57 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 9, 16, 19 (Supp. II 1955).
58 See Sherman, The Universal Copyright Convention: Its Effect On United
States Law, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 1137, 1150 (1955).
59 See Derenberg, Copyright Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 334, 335 (1956).
6o Universal Copyright Convention art. VIII, § 2.
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Literary Property
"Literary property at common law embraces prints, pictures,
paintings, photographs, pictorial illustrations, statuary and other
artistic productions, as well as musical, dramatic and literary composi-
tions, and other written or printed manuscripts .. ," 61 It is an
owner's common-law right 62 in an intellectual endeavor to exclude
others 3 and enjoy its use and profits.64 While copyrights are exclu-
sively statutory in nature, literary property exists independently of
any statute.6 5 This property right in unpublished products 66 termi-
nates upon publication, 67 in spite of the fact that there may have been
a right to copyright.68 Compliance with the statute supplants the
common-law protection. 69 Literary property is intangible 70 and has a
distinct existence separate and apart from the physical medium which
records it.71
The recent case of Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp.7 2 presents the conflicts problem. Capitol Records sought a
declaratory judgment as to rights in recordings which were acquired
from a German corporation which owned the original property rights.
Mercury obtained identical recordings from the Czechoslovakian alien
property custodian who had confiscated them in Germany. The court
determined that the particular performance could not be copyrighted
61 BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 472 (1944); see Frohman v.
Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 87 N.E. 327 (1909), aff'd, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
62 See Schulman, International Copyright In The United States: A Critical
Analysis, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 141, 145 (1954).
63 Keene v. Wheatley, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 7644, at 191-92 (C.C.E.D. PA. 1861)
(dictum); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 55-56 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1855)
(dictum).
64 Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 324 (2d Cir.
1904) (dictum).
65 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 84 (1899) (dictum) ; Krafft v. Cohen, 117
F.2d 579, 580 (3d Cir. 1941) (dictum).
66 Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (2d Cir. 1896); American Tobacco
Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907) (dictum).
67 See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Grandma Moses
Properties, Inc. v. This Week Magazine, 117 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);
The Jewelers' Mercantile Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co.,
155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898).
68 See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 712 (1940).
69 Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909) (dictum);
Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 220 Fed. 448,
450 (2d Cir. 1915) (dictum); Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed.
577, 580 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704 (1914).
70 See Walden, Common Law Rights in Literary Property, 37 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 642, 659 (1955).
71 See SPRING, RISKS & RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING TELEVISION RADIO MOTION
PICTURES ADVERTISING AND THE THEATER 75 (1st ed. 1952).
72 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955). For a detailed consideration of the case's
relationship to copyright law, see Kaplan, Performer's Right And Copyright:
The Capitol Records Case, 69 HARV. L. REV. 409 (1956).
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under federal law because the composition was in the public domain.
Neither German or Czechoslovakian law was applied by the court be-
cause it would then "be faced with dealing with property interests
unknown to our law." 73 Rather, being pragmatic, the court decided
that it would ". . . be much more convenient to determine the effect
of each act by the law of the place where the right of property is
sought to be exercised." 74 This rule, though analogous to the doc-
trine of lex fori,75 is most likely an implied adoption of the doctrine
that the situs of the property establishes the determining law.7 6 It
would seem to be consistent with the Restatement's test that the con-
trolling law is the law of the place where the property is found.77 It
is thus seen that literary property may be situated without the creator's
domicile. Accordingly, it would be immaterial that the law of the
place where the res is created does not recognize rights in literary
property. Moreover, recognition of the right may take place in a
legal system differing from that of the author's domicile or location.
Furthermore, since the domicile of the plaintiff, Capitol, was not dis-
cussed, it is apparent that the domicile of the owner is immaterial.
Thus the doctrine that intangible property has a situs at the domicile
of the owner 78 was impliedly rejected. It follows from this process
of elimination that literary property has a separate, independent situs.
Other leading cases compel such a conclusion. In Ferris v. Frohuan,79
American recognition of literary property rights in a play of English
authorship was sought. The play had been publicly performed in
England, thereby destroying the rights attending literary property.
The court found, however, that the literary property, extinct in Eng-
land, was still extant in the United States. It had a situs apart from
the author's domicile. In Roberts v. Petrova,8 0 it was held that the
abrogation, by statute, of all literary property rights in England did
not eliminate the existence of those rights elsewhere. Again, they had
an independent situs.
The Restatement view that "the original creation of property in
an intangible thing which exists in fact apart from law is governed by
the law of the state in which it exists," 81 explains the result in the
Capitol Records case. It would, however, seem to be of doubtful utility
in the solution of future problems. The fact that situs is where the
73 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 662 (2d
Cir. 1955).
74 Ibid.
7 This doctrine is traditionally thought, however, to deal with questions of
choice of remedy. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82 (3d ed. 1949).
76 See FALCONBRIDGE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 442-43 (2d ed. 1954).
77 See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 212 (1934).
78 See I BEAL., CoNFLIcT OF LAWS § 51.1 (1935) ; cf. STORY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 311 (1834).
79223 U.S. 424 (1912).
s0 126 Misc. 86, 213 N.Y. Supp. 434 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd mem., 219 App.
Div. 772, 219 N.Y. Supp. 903 (1st Dep't 1927).
81 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 212 (1934).
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property "exists" would indicate that it will have multiple siti in inter-
state businesses. The majority in the Capitol Records case recognized
that the rule there propounded was necessary in the absence of a
uniform international law of literary property.8 2 The Universal Copy-
right Convention requires the adoption of statutory protection for
rights in literary property; 83 American conformity to this mandate 84
will insure needed uniformity.
Ideas
The highly competitive pictorial industries-motion pictures, tele-
vision and advertising-have increased the legal significance of ideas.8 5
Until recently, the law had not fully protected rights in ideas.8 6 Sev-
eral theories, however, have been propounded to effectuate legal pro-
tection. For example, the remedies relative to the creation of a
confidential relationship,8 7 an implied contract,88 quasi-contract, 9 or
an express contract 90 have all been employed to protect the originators
of ideas. It should be noted that the chances of success in an action
on a contract have been considerably lessened by the theory that cer-
tain ideas do not constitute consideration sufficient to support a
82 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d
Cir. 1955).
83 Article I of the Universal Copyright Convention calls for protection of
the rights of authors; Article II refers to "unpublished works"; and Article X
notes that "each State party to this Convention undertakes to adopt, in ac-
cordance with its Constitution, such measures as are necessary to ensure the
application of this -Convention."
84 See Dubin, The Universal Copyright Convention, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 89.
105 (1954) ; Wasserstrom, Some Reflections on Articles VII, IX, X, XV, and
XX of the Universal Copyright Convention, in UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVEN-
TION ANALYZED 63, 69 (1955).
85 See Warner, Legal Protection Of Program Ideas, 36 VA. L. REV. 289
(1950) ; Note, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 323 (1949) ; 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 113 (1953).
86 See Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E.
506 (1892); Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N.J. Eq. 575, 64 Ati. 436 (Ch. 1906), aff'd
per curiant, 75 N.J. Eq. 622, 73 AtI. 1118 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909); WALSH,
EQUITY 219, 225 (1930).
87 See, e.g., Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1932);
Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1929) ; Jones
v. Ulrich, 342 Ill. App. 16, 95 N.E.2d 113 (1950). The unequal positions of
originator and manufacturer create this fiduciary relationship even in cases not
involving employer and employee. See Sachs v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 265
App. Div. 497, 39 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd inem., 291 N.Y. 772.
53 N.E.2d 241 (1944).
88 See Kurlan v. C.B.S., 40 Cal. 2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953); Stanley v.
C.B.S., 35 Cal. App. 2d 35, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
89 See Nash v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1950);
Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935).
But see Grombach Productions, Inc. v. Waring, 293 N.Y. 609, 59 N.E.2d 425
(1944).
90 See Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 262 App. Div. 116, 28 N.Y.S.2d 404
(1st Dep't 1941) ; Brunner v. Stix, Baer & Fuller Co., 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S.W.2d
643 (1944).
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contract. 91 Application of the property concept to ideas would pro-
vide protection against all the world,9 2 whereas there is only limited
protection for contractual rights.93  In the case of Hamilton Nat'l
Bank v. Belt,94 the originator of an idea for a radio program disclosed
the plan to a sponsor, who appropriated it. In allowing recovery, the
court held that an idea which is novel, original and concrete is prop-
erty. This requirement that an idea be more than merely abstract 9 5
is of significance in determining the situs of an idea. Although the
full meaning of "concreteness" is unsettled,9 6 a survey of applicable
New York decisions reveals that a reduction of an idea to paper is
vital to a finding of concreteness.97  This requisite would also seem
to be determinative of situs. Though assignment of a situs is fictional,
it would be logical to ally the idea with the physical property which
evidences it.
The conflicting theories in various jurisdictions regarding protec-
tion of ideas highlight the need for uniformity. The fact that some
states distinguish between ideas which are literary in nature 98 and
ideas involving business or scientific techniques 99 illustrates the con-
91 See, e.g., Masline v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 95 Conn. 702, 112 Atl.
639 (1921). Contra, American Mint Corp. v. Ex-Lax, Inc., 263 App. Div. 89,
31 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1st Dep't 1941).
92 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(dissenting opinion).
93 Recent California cases have apparently adopted the property theory. See,
e.g., Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 2d 690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950) ;
Kovacs v. Mutual Broadcasting System, 35 Cal. App. 2d 56, 221 P.2d 108 (1950).
More recently, this theory has been considered abrogated in that state on the
basis of statutory interpretation. See Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. App. 2d
778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953) ; Nimmer, The Law Of Ideas, 27 So. CALIF. L. REV.
119, 121 (1954).
94 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
95 Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62, 63 (D. Mass. 1942)
(dictum); How J. Ryan & Assoc. v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 60,
55 P.2d 1053, 1054 (1936) (dictum).
96 See Nimmer, supra note 93, at 140.
97 See, e.g., O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y.
1946); Ketcham v. New York World's Fair 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657
(E.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd per cariain, 119 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Rodriguez v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 259 App. Div. 224, 18 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1st Dep't 1940)
(per curiam), aff'd mere., 285 N.Y. 667, 34 N.E.2d 375 (1941) ; Williamson v.
New York Cent. R.R., 258 App. Div. 226, 16 N.Y.S.2d 217 (2d Dep't 1939)
(per curiam); Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 23 N.Y.S.2d
892 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Larkin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 125 Misc. 238, 210 N.Y.
Supp. 374 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd mere., 216 App. Div. 832, 215 N.Y. Supp. 875
(1st Dep't 1926), af'd nein., 245 N.Y. 578, 157 N.E. 864 (1927); Bailey v.
Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 193 Misc. 723, 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Syracuse
Munic. Ct. 1948).
9a See, e.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(radio program) ; Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 2d 690, 221
P.2d 95 (1950) (motion picture).
99 These ideas may not be protected. See Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner,
161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947) (temperature
recorder chart) ; Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir.
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fusion. Since ideas are analogous to literary property,10 0 it is sug-
gested that the conflict rules pertaining to literary property be applied
to ideas.
Competition
The concept of intangible property situs in the field of competition
-trademarks, unfair competition and good-will 101 -has to a large
extent been ignored or avoided. Because most interference with com-
petition is in the realm of torts, the doctrine of lex loci delicti is
applicable. 10 2 In addition, the advent of federal control 103 has served
to eliminate much interstate conflict. However, the concept of situs
remains important in determining the choice of law that will indicate
the extent of a right or liability. Socit6 Vinicole De Champagne v.
Mumm Champagna & Importation Co. 104 involved a German firm,
engaged in making wine in France, which was confiscated 105 during
wartime and sold to the plaintiff. In upholding the plaintiff's conten-
tion that it had acquired a property interest in the good-will of the
1936) (theater bank night); Lewis v. Kroger Co., 109 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.
W.Va. 1952) (contest).
100 See SPRING, RISKS & RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING TELEVISION RADIO MOTION
PICTURES ADVERTISING AND THE THEATER 255 (1st ed. 1952).
101 The scope of this note does not include a textual treatment of the unique
subject of patents. It is recognized that patents are property. See Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) ; United States
v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897) ; 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952). The
nature of patents is analogous in many respects to that of other treated
intangibles. Patent infringement may constitute unfair competition. See
1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 16.1 (2d ed. 1950).
Like copyrights, patents are federally controlled under constitutional authority.
U. S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. And, like literary property, patents had a common-
law existence. See ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS §§ 2, 3 (3d ed. 1955). How-
ever, patents have often been considered to possess a nature more like realty
than personalty. See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co.,
266 U.S. 342 (1924). In the final analysis, patents are unlike other forms of
property. See Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S.
24 (1923). Patents are ". . . still a novelty in the law. The wisdom of the
common law gives neither maxims nor precedents to guide, and the American
cases which deal with it, though numerous enough, run in a narrow, statutory
groove. Though the most intangible form of property, it still, in many charac-
teristics, is closer in analogy to real than to personal estate." Solomons v.
United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 479, 483 (1886), aff'd, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
102 See BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378.2 (1935); cf. American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
103 E.g., The McGuire Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952). For an
excellent appraisal of the conflict of laws problem with regard to the enforce-
ment of fair trade laws, see Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 525 (1955).
104 10 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
105 The problem of confiscation of property outside of a national jurisdiction
is a subject of great concern in international law. For an exhaustive survey
of the field, see RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1951) :
Re, Judicial Developments In Sovereign Immunity And Foreign Confiscations.
1 N.Y.L. FORUM 160 (1955).
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business, the court ruled that the situs of the intangible was entirely
within France. The situs of good-will was thus identified with the
location of the business.
Since trademarks and the concept of unfair competition are
parallel in nature 106 it would seem that parallel conflicts rules should
be applied.' 0 7 It is to be noted, however, that the uniformity imposed
by the federal trademark law 108 avoids the necessity of considering
situs. Internationally, the domicile of the owner of the trademark
may be determinative of both situs and the controlling law, regardless
of the law of the place of infringement. 10 9 Such a conclusion is not
settled, and this rule may actually only demonstrate the view that a
nation has power to control the conduct of native businessmen
abroad." 0 Another view of the situs of trademarks may be seen in
a case which involved the liquidation of French monks' property,
which included a liqueur-producing process.1 ' The Supreme Court
held that the confiscation had no effect on trademarks which were
registered and situated in the United States. Recently, in Zwack v.
Kraus Bros. & Co.," 2 it was held that trademarks of a nationalized
Hungarian partnership were property located in the United States,
thus the foreign confiscatory law was inapplicable to the domestic res.
On the basis of these decisions, it may well be that trademarks are
intangible property having situs outside of the owner's domicile.113
Unfair competition may be regulated federally, to some extent,
under the doctrine of "pendent jurisdiction." For example, an action
which involves both trademark infringement and unfair competition,
which is faulty on the trademark theory, is retained by federal
courts." 4  Although jurisdiction is retained, the majority of federal
106 See 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COmPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 4.1 (2d ed.
1950).
107 See Comment, The Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 28 RocKY MT. L.
REv. 111 (1955).
108 Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1952).
109 See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). A "national treat-
ment principle," much like that afforded copyrights in the Universal Copyright
Convention, is embodied in the Lanham T- de-Mark Act. See 4 CALL11ANN,
op. cit. supra note 106, § 99.2(a).
110 See Wengler, Laws Concerning Unfair Competition and the Conflict of
Laws, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 167, 175 (1955).
2", Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580 (1911).
112 133 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
113 The problem of situs would be avoided if trademarks were accorded full
protection outside of the jurisdiction of creation. Such protection has been
granted between states. See, e.g., Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 293 (1865) ; State
v. Gibbs, 56 Mo. 133 (1874). Internationally, the conflicts problem is often
resolved by a nation requiring a foreign trademark to be registered at the
domicile before allowing local registration. See Wengler, supra note 110, at
174 n.23.
114 Cf. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair com-
petition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright,
patent or trade-mark laws." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1952). See also Schreyer
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courts reject the rule that federal law is applicable x" and hold that
state law is controlling." 6 Under this majority view the situs of the
property right against unfair competition is of major importance. It
would seem that the trademark concept of an independent situs should
be applied in unfair competition cases, at least until unfair competition
is federally treated."
7
Conclusion
There does not seem to be a basis for serious dissent to uniform
protection of intangible property rights. Protection of intangibles as
property has a sound foundation in natural justice, and expanding
commerce necessitates uniformity in treatment. The obvious solution
is universal uniformity achieved through international legislation. In
that connection, the Universal Copyright Convention could serve as a
model for the attainment of such an objective. Until practical political
objections can be overcome, however, a norm for the solution of con-
flict of laws problems must be adopted. Situs is a norm, if situs is
universally applied with consistency. A recapitulation of the laws
governing real intangible property will show that intangibles are
closely allied with tangible, readily-located property; a copyright is
allied with a book it protects, good-will with a business and an idea
with its concrete plan. Perhaps the situs of a real intangible can be
considered to be the situs of its natural, physical ally. It is only in
reliance on tangibles that the disharmonizing fiction of intangible situs
can be limited if not eliminated.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE - "FEDERAL" OR "NATIONAL"?
Introduction
In Rea v. United States,' the defendant had been indicted in a
federal district court for the unlawful acquisition of marihuana. 2
v. Casco Products Corp., 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
913 (1952).
115 See Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947).
116 National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499
(D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944) ; see Swarthmore Classics.
Inc. v. Swarthmore Junior, 81 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) ; Folmer Graflex
Corp. v. Graphic Photo Service, 44 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mass. 1940).
11 Such federal control is advocated in Note, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1323(1947).
1350 U.S. 214 (1956).
253 STAT. 281 (1939), 26 U.S.C. §2593(a) (1952).
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